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AbstrAct
The prolonged witch hunt in Spanish Navarre from 1608 to 1614 was extraordinary 
in several respects, ranging from the huge number of persons accused to the unprec-
edented protagonism of children as accusers. Above all, it marked a decisive turning 
point in the Inquisition’s attitude toward witches. From this point onward, the tribunal 
not only forsook the persecution of diabolical witchcraft in practice. It also devised 
explicit rules regarding procedure and evidence to make sure that such trials would not 
be repeated. This chapter examines this unusual episode, and underlines its significance 
for the broader study of how the early modern European witch craze came to an end.
La extendida caza de brujas que tuvo lugar en la Navarra española desde 1608 a 1614 
presentaba varias características extraordinarias, entre ellas el elevadísimo número de per-
sonas acusadas y el protagonismo sin precedentes de niños entre las filas de los acusadores. 
Ésta marcó un cambio decisivo en la actitud de la Inquisición hacia la brujería. A partir 
de este momento, el tribunal dejó de perseguir a la brujería diabólica y formuló un nuevo 
reglamento relativo al procedimiento y al tipo de pruebas admitidas que asegurara que 
no se repetirían tales procesos. Este capítulo examina este episodio tan inusual, y subraya 
su significado para el estudio más amplio de cómo acabó la caza de brujas de la Europa 
moderna.
“You should not believe everything in the Malleus Maleficarum”.
Supreme Council of the Inquisition, 27 November 15381
Of all the mysteries waiting to be resolved in the history of early modern European 
witchcraft – and by mystery I do not mean anything arcane or Davincian, but rather a 
problem that has yet to find a fully convincing solution – the one that continues to re-
ceive most emphasis is how and why the persecution of witches began in the first place. 
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The equally puzzling question of how and why this persecution came to an end has in 
comparison received much less attention. This chapter brings to wider notice one of 
the more intriguing episodes in the decline and fall of the early modern prosecution of 
witchcraft: the 1610 trials in Spanish Navarre. This prolonged investigation, which has 
been studied in painstaking detail by the Danish folklorist Gustav Henningsen, culmi-
nated in the Spanish Inquisition’s definitive decision in 1614 not to prosecute thereaf-
ter the crime of diabolical witchcraft2. The Navarrese incident is not only relevant to 
the specific issue of witch hunts, and the way in which their decline was related to shifts 
in opinion regarding the nature of witchcraft, diabolic intervention in the sphere of 
natural phenomena, and the like. It also reveals some interesting aspects of the practical 
functioning of early modern legal institutions – aspects that traditional legal history, 
with its near exclusive attention to jurisprudence and legal thought, rarely takes into 
account. The latter will be the focus of this brief chapter, which nevertheless will seek 
to keep the crucial question of religious and intellectual change in sight.
the witches of NAvArre
The witch hunt began in the villages of Zugarramurdi and Urdax in the northern reach-
es of the present-day region of Navarre, Spain, not far from what is now the border with 
France. In December 1608 a woman who had recently returned from a stay in nearby 
Labourd, on the French side of the frontier, confessed to having been a member of a 
coven of witches. She soon began to denounce other villagers as members of the dia-
bolical sect, and before long a dozen or so women admitted their crimes and asked the 
community for pardon. The subsequent intervention of the Inquisition turned a local 
affair into a much broader scandal. The investigation by the Holy Office – the other 
name by which this tribunal was known – turned up horrifying details of at least 20 
aquelarres, the Basque term for witches’ sabbaths. These meetings, which were attended 
by numerous children as well as adults, were devoted to the standard crimes of witches. 
These included: using toads to make poisons in cauldrons; attendance at a black mass 
presided over by the devil in person, who received tokens of the witches’ obedience; 
mass sex, including sodomy and incest; and above all, acts of cannibalism, involving the 
murder of infants in particular. Dozens of villagers were arrested and tried, and in the 
end 29 were convicted. Of these, six were sentenced to be burned alive at an auto da fe 
– the Inquisition’s distinctive spectacle of public punishment – held in November 1610 
in the city of Logroño, where the tribunal had its local headquarters. Most of the others 
received light sentences in exchange for confessing their guilt.
This ghastly spectacle of exemplary retribution should have been the end of the problem. 
But it was only the beginning. The Inquisitors originally assigned to the case, Alonso 
Becerra and Juan de Valle Alvarado, were determined to eradicate diabolic witchcraft 
in the vicinity. They now planned a broader campaign, in tandem with their superiors 
Revising the Rules for Prosecuting Spanish Witches 79
Law, sovereignty and compliance
in Madrid, the so-called Suprema, or Supreme Council of the Inquisition. The local 
judges firmly believed in the existence of a huge satanic conspiracy in the north, and 
even sent an alarmist report directly to king Philip III. The Suprema in turn proposed 
a massive campaign to identify the witches by offering an “Edict of Grace”, that is, an 
amnesty for all those fully willing to admit membership in the sect. By the summer of 
1611 the earlier trickle of witchcraft had become a river. In the end, over 8400 individu-
als – many of whom were children – confessed to being witches, or were denounced as 
such. Both its size as well as the high proportion of minors involved made the Navarrese 
witch craze one of the more anomalous, and certainly the largest, episodes of witchcraft 
in recorded history.
Stretching the accusatorial net to bring in such a large catch ran into growing oppo-
sition. Two foci of resistance proved to be particularly important. The first centered 
around Antonio Venegas de Figueroa, the bishop of Pamplona. From the beginning 
he had let known his opposition to the persecution of witches. He was joined by Her-
nando de Solarte, a Basque-speaking Jesuit from the order’s college in the nearby city 
of Bilbao. While initially willing to countenance the hunt for witches, Solarte quickly 
changed his mind, and tried to stem the tide of accusations in the valleys he visited 
while administering the sacraments to the hoards of peasants who confessed to attend-
ing sabbaths and participating in other practices of devil worship. But it was above all 
the canon lawyer Alonso de Salazar Frías, the third and most recently appointed mem-
ber of the panel of Inquisitorial judges, whose doubts were to prove instrumental in 
bringing the witch craze to an end. In May 1611 he began a visita or official visitation of 
the area at the behest of the Suprema. While making his way slowly through northern 
and western Navarre and much of the Basque country, Salazar recorded the confes-
sions of villagers who admitted to being witches. In particular he absolved the great 
numbers of children who confessed to attending nocturnal sabbaths. In March 1612, 
after spending almost eight months on the road, and filling some 5600 folios with af-
fidavits, he informed Madrid of his findings. His conclusions were as simple as they 
were devastating: “I have not found a single proof, not even the slightest indication”, he 
wrote, “from which to infer that an act of witchcraft has actually taken place”. Rather, 
he attributed the mass confessions to dreams and illusions on the one hand, and to the 
coercive pressure of neighbors and kinsmen on the other. Salazar also blamed the epi-
demic of witch accusations on the suggestive power of outside preachers, and the spread 
of information about witchcraft as news of the 1610 auto da fe reached the mountain 
areas. “I have observed that there were neither witches nor bewitched in a village until 
they were talked and written about”3. He recommended that the Inquisition put a halt 
to prosecutions, and silence any further discussion of witchcraft.
Salazar’s fellow judges were outraged by this insubordination, and urged the Suprema 
to ignore the findings of the visitation. Their junior colleague replied to their objec-
tions in a series of five reports, written from September 1613 to the spring of the fol-
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lowing year. His pronounced skepticism regarding the possibility of diabolic witchcraft 
having been committed was seconded by another authoritative voice, that of Pedro de 
Valencia. One of Spain’s leading humanist scholars, Valencia had been asked in early 
1611 by the Inquisitor-General to express his opinion of the Logroño trials of 1610. 
His response was to produce a short treatise which, while couched in cautious language 
and full of what may well have been deliberately distracting erudition, recommended 
bringing this embarrassing episode to a swift conclusion by preventing any other trials 
from taking place4. His and Salazar’s advice prevailed. On 29 August 1614 the Suprema 
wrote to the Navarrese tribunal and for all intents and purposes ordered it to cease its 
investigations (see the documentary appendix for excerpts from this letter). It also sent 
the same orders to other tribunals. Seen in retrospect, the Instructions of 1614 effec-
tively brought Inquisitorial prosecution for the heresy of diabolic witchcraft in Spain 
to an end.
MANdAtiNg ModerAtioN
The absence of crucial sources makes it impossible to reconstruct the precise path by 
which the Inquisition reached this decision. As is the case with most early modern tri-
bunals, their members’ deliberations were not recorded, or even minuted. Neither was 
much committed to writing regarding the specific arguments used to justify final deci-
sions, even in those (relatively few) legal systems which issued opinions when rendering 
judgments. In this particular case, several especially important documents are missing. 
These include the affidavits gathered by Salazar; the entire original trial record was de-
stroyed in 1808 along with all the other papers housed in the local archive of the Inqui-
sition. Enough source material survives, however, to allow us to make a few informed 
guesses about the diverse factors at work in the all-important decision of 1614. Years 
of patient archival research by the leading student of the Navarre trials, the Danish 
folklorist Gustav Henningsen, has led to the assemblage of a rich corpus in both the 
original Spanish and in English translation which permits the accurate reconstruction 
of many of the key decisions taken by both local and superior judges. This specific paper 
trail is the most valuable aid to understanding how the policy directive of 1614 took 
shape5.
The instructions are divided into 32 chapters, and focus closely on questions of legal 
procedure. The Inquisitors on the scene were enjoined to locate and identify the corpus 
delicti of anyone whom the witches admitted to killing, and to ascertain if the cause of 
death was “natural or violent” (c. 1). The same held for all other acts of harm to live-
stock, fields, fruit trees, and the like (c. 4-5). They were also to establish if the witches 
actually met and if so, if anyone saw them do so (c. 3 and 8). They were likewise to 
have local preachers inform the faithful that damage to crops from bad weather, blight, 
and other misfortunes was not to be automatically attributed to witches (c. 7). Anyone 
Revising the Rules for Prosecuting Spanish Witches 81
Law, sovereignty and compliance
wishing to revoke earlier confessions and accusations was to be received with blandura 
(gentleness) – a major concession, given that the officially stipulated penalty for “false” 
confessions was capital punishment (c. 12). Leading questions were not to be asked in 
interrogations, and judges were to be generous in using their powers of absolution (c. 
13-14 and 17). All accusations in course at the time were to be suspended and for the 
present no decisions were to be made locally without consulting the Suprema, unless 
it was to end proceedings (c. 17-20). Finally, all involved were ordered to keep silent 
and to adhere to the Inquisition’s traditional policy of secrecy, and not to start nor 
spread gossip and rumors (c. 31). Not one of the 32 clauses of the Instructions expresses 
doubts concerning the existence of witchcraft, or the reality of the pact with the devil. 
Yet it takes little reading between the lines to see that the tribunal was trying to rectify 
a situation that had gone seriously wrong. References to “the damage that has been 
done” (c. 29), or to “the difficulty of this matter and the deceits (engaños) to which it 
gives rise” (c. 14) point in the same direction – that a disaster had taken place, and these 
guidelines were to be the first steps toward correcting it.
Of the many intriguing characteristics of this document, several stand out. The first is 
its very nature. In its original form, the text was a set of specific instructions addressed 
to the tribunal that had overseen – and mishandled – what was now viewed as a highly 
problematic case. Yet by forwarding the instructions on to other tribunals in the form 
of a carta acordada or circular letter, the Holy Office turned them into a policy binding 
on all the local branches of the Holy Office. “Policy” is the key word here. For the docu-
ment, while judicial in character, was not jurisprudential. It neither cited legal doctrine 
nor made formal legal arguments. Rather, it set stricter limits on the type of decisions 
local officials could make, while making little or no reference to the more general legal 
issues involved.
It one were to sum up this policy in a word, it would be the need for “discretion”. Dis-
cretion was understood here in the classic sense of balanced, self-aware judgment, but 
also in the sense of more flexible response in a context in which the formal contents of 
the law – as well as the theological beliefs on which the law was based – suffered no 
modifications. This point deserves emphasis. The decision effectively to stop prosecut-
ing diabolical witchcraft did not involve any change in doctrine or teaching. In fact, no 
mention is made of the decision itself. Rather, the new instructions focus on tightening 
up procedures, above all by centralizing decision-making and effectively reducing local 
autonomy. The most consequential change – opting for future avoidance of persecu-
tion of witches – is nowhere stated explicitly as such. Rather, its significance can be 
gauged only in retrospect.
If the emphasis was on discretion, the motivation was doubt. Here the Suprema’s lan-
guage was quite clear: “this matter of witchcraft is difficult and doubts may arise” (c. 
18). But doubts about what? The Inquisition never questioned its right to judge cases 
involving witchcraft. As far as it was concerned, despite the mixed nature of the crime 
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and the imprecision of royal legislation, its jurisdiction was never in dispute. (Things 
were different in much of the rest of Europe, where malefic magic could often be tried 
only in secular courts, if local legal practice mandated it). Rather, doubt appeared in 
relation to the tribunal’s capacity to make correct decisions. One can only guess at 
the specific chain of events that led to this quandary. First came the criticisms by local 
Church authorities and missionaries such as Solarte of the way in which the persecu-
tion had been carried out. (Criticism of the Inquisition was hardly unknown in early 
modern Spain, but it was rarely expressed so directly). Then came the division among 
the tribunal’s own judges, when Salazar broke ranks with his two colleagues while car-
rying out his visitation. Again, there was nothing new about the lack of unanimity 
among judges in the field; adjudicating among different points of view was, after all, 
one of the central Council’s main tasks. But the implications of this case of dissension 
went far beyond standard discrepancies over voting, to touch on fundamental issues of 
content as well as procedure. Hence the significance of Pedro de Valencia’s brief. From 
an external stance of an amicus curiae distant from the scene of the crime, he arrived at 
the same conclusion as Salazar: that uncertainty involving not just what the witches 
were purported to be doing, but also how the tribunal could be certain about its ability 
properly to assess this behavior, went deep enough to justify an attitude of extreme cau-
tion, if not outright skepticism.
From an intellectual point of view, there was nothing new here. The Inquisition had 
long felt – and what is more, openly expressed – doubts regarding the reality of the 
sabbath, night flight, and other key aspects of the concept of diabolical witchcraft. That 
such doubts had deep roots in the history of the institution is revealed most clearly by 
the deliberations of a special committee that met in Granada in 1526 at the behest of 
the Inquisitor General Alonso de Manrique6. Alarmed by recent witch-hunts in (once 
again) Navarre, Manrique charged the panel of ten theologians and canon lawyers to 
issue a clear statement on the reality of witch practice. Among the questions to be re-
solved were:
- do witches really commit the heinous acts attributed to them, or are they deceived 
into thinking that they commit their crimes?
- in either case, what punishment do they deserve?
- whether the Inquisition has jurisdiction over these acts (that is, do they involve her-
esy)?
- may witches be sentenced to death solely on the evidence of their confessions, or are 
other proofs required?
The panel answered the opening and decisive question by opting for the first alterna-
tive, but by the narrowest possible margin: six voted in favor, four against. The closeness 
of this and other votes suggested deep divisions among experts over all these matters, 
except the issue of jurisdiction, which the members ratified almost unanimously. Not 
surprisingly, the instructions that were issued following this meeting were moderate 
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in tone and content. Leniency was urged, and in the case of voluntary confessions the 
property of suspects was not to be seized (such confiscation was the tribunal’s standard 
operating procedure). Moreover, no arrests were to be made if based solely on the testi-
mony of other suspected witches, and judicial torture was to be used with due caution. 
Inquisitorial policy hewed closely to this line in the future. The Suprema did not au-
thorize the execution of a single witch until the Navarrese auto of 1610, although local 
Inquisitors in Zaragoza (1535) and Barcelona (1549) burned eight witches without its 
approval, for which they were severely reprimanded. In short, the real anomaly was not 
the turn against witch prosecution in 1614. Instead, it was the break in 1610 with the 
attitude of distance and moderation that had prevailed up to that point.
Thus, while in some ways 1614 represented a turning point, in others respects it signified 
a return to previous practices which reflected longstanding uncertainties regarding fun-
damental aspects of witchcraft and its prosecution7. Even if these lingering doubts were 
not resolved intellectually, they were acknowledged to be strong enough to become the 
leading determinant of judicial behavior. Without ever saying it as such, doubt became 
the official policy of an institution notorious for lacking it.
The instructions had yet another purpose in that they sought to correct a mistake with-
in a system that did not publicly admit to making mistakes8. The Inquisition had of 
course committed serious errors of perception and procedure before. For example, in 
Murcia from 1560 to 1571 a vain and overly-ambitious Inquisitor fell for the bait set 
out by a group of families from the city’s elite. Only after he had executed 135 descend-
ants of converted Jews on flimsy charges of crypto-Judaism did the Suprema realize 
that the Holy Office had been manipulated into physically eliminating the rival faction 
within the municipal government9. The mistake made in Navarre appeared to be quite 
similar. In both cases the Supreme Council had ratified a series of decisions made by 
zealous local Inquisitors. But unlike the Murcian precedent, in Navarre the 1610 auto 
da fe did not bring an end to the persecution. Becerra and Valle Alvarado’s informing 
Madrid that potentially thousands of other witches awaited prosecution eventually set 
off the alarm bells. When reports from local critics and above all the conclusions of 
Salazar’s visitation documented basic violations of procedure – including the crucial in-
fluence of extra-judicial coercion, the uncritical acceptance of testimony from minors, 
and disattention to revocations of earlier depositions – Madrid, after some initial foot 
dragging, intervened to halt further prosecution. The reference in the opening clause 
to “past and present mistakes” was as close as it came to admitting its errors. Perhaps 
the most revealing statement regarding specific responsibilities could be found in sec-
tions 26 and 29. These refer to the coercion relatives and neighbors brought to bear 
on the accused, and to over-zealousness on the part of the commissioners, the local 
clerical representatives of the Inquisition, who were now enjoined to “moderation and 
temperance” and warned against committing “excesses”. Predictably enough, neither 
the lower-level judges nor their superiors faced charges of dereliction of duty. Rather, 
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correction came in the form of an in-house memorandum, which was not destined for 
public notice10. Making the policy public would have to await the next occasion in 
which the Inquisition faced the problem of what to do with witches.
iN the AfterMAth
Fresh opportunities for testing the new guidelines did not take long to arise. Beginning 
around 1618, in the wake of crop failure and other natural disasters, local magistrates 
in Catalonia in the northeastern corner of Spain began to execute dozens of women as 
witches. At first both the Inquisition and the Audiència, or royal appeals court, proved 
unable to control the outbreak of accusations. Attempts by the latter to revoke local 
trials to its jurisdiction proved unsuccessful, as a report it drew up in 1621 admitted. 
To remedy the situation the Audiència suggested that a general pardon be issued to all 
witch suspects, and that in the future the Inquisition be the sole tribunal empowered 
to try this offense. The former in particular proved to be controversial, and in 1622 
Salazar himself entered the fray by intervening before the Council of Aragon to sup-
port the proposal for a pardon. In the end neither measure was enacted, and the perse-
cution died down in the later 1620s. At first sight, there was little difference between 
the Catalan outbreak and the earlier “plague” of witches in Navarre. Both took place 
near the northern border, in the Pyrenees mountains, and in both instances the crimes 
involved fell into royal (and to make matters more complex, seigneurial) as well as In-
quisitorial jurisdictions. What was new was the attitude of the Holy Office. From the 
beginning the Inquisition distinguished itself from local authorities – secular judges in 
the townships and seigneuries as well as many of the bishops and resident clergy – by 
its reluctance to charge anyone with witchcraft. In fact, in some cases, it clearly stepped 
into judicial proceedings under way in order to protect the accused from the harsh 
punishments then being meted out, much as the Audiència tried to do. Thus in 1621, 
the Barcelona tribunal claimed jurisdiction over a case in which an eighteen-year-old 
woman from Caldes de Montbui was denounced (under torture) by six elderly women 
for attending sabbaths. The Inquisitors briefly interrogated her, and then set her free 
unconditionally. In this and several other cases the Holy Office became involved in a 
crime that it no longer took seriously, in order to spare suspects from being lynched by 
their neighbors who did11.
One needs to keep in mind that the Spanish Inquisition was not the only contemporary 
tribunal to decide not to prosecute demonic witchcraft. At roughly the same moment 
the other major Inquisition – that of Rome, under direct papal jurisdiction – was arriv-
ing at the same conclusion12. The chronology is far from clear, and the Roman case does 
not seem to have been motivated by the same sort of reaction to a large-scale judicial 
failure. Still, by the early 1620s the papal bureaucracy was willing to endorse a major 
tightening of procedures, directed toward making the prosecution of witches much 
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more difficult. What was eventually printed in the 1650s as the “Instructions on How 
to Carry Out Trials against Witches, Magicians and Sorcerers” had taken form around 
1623, and was soon sent out to guide local officials on matters of judicial conduct13. 
It was also reproduced in general manuals of Inquisitorial procedure beginning with 
its inclusion in Italian translation in the 1625 version of Eliseo Masini’s widely read 
guide to the prosecution of heresy14. Whether the Spanish instructions influenced their 
Roman counterpart is questionable. However, there can be little doubt that Iberian 
practice constituted an important precedent for the papal Inquisitors, who explicitly 
alluded to the Spanish tribunal’s leniency when promoting the same policy in their own 
bailiwick and beyond15.
Both sets of instructions reflected and, up to a point, tried to resolve the differing un-
derstandings of and approaches to witchcraft within institutions that were reputed to 
be uniform in theory but which turned out to be markedly diverse in practice. Spain 
and Italy represented the doctrinally more conservative side of the Catholic handling 
of illicit magic, that which looked back to the mid-12th-century Canon episcopi – the 
standard and, in retrospect, remarkably enlightened statement of medieval jurispru-
dence regarding witches – as a guide to understanding and dealing with this problem16. 
It had never completely assimilated the revolutionary concept of diabolic witchcraft 
that first emerged in the later 14th century and opened the way to mass trials begin-
ning in the 16th century – the infamous “witch craze” of early modern Europe. This 
meant that southern Europe would be spared the sort of mass witch hunts typically 
found in the north, including such staunchly Catholic areas as Bavaria until the 1590s, 
or Würzburg through the 1620s17. The Spanish volte-face of 1614 was arguably the first, 
and certainly the most visible, in a series of decisions by large-scale judicial institutions 
to forgo the persecution of magic in terms of diabolical witchcraft. That it was framed 
as a mixture of relentless focus on procedural detail, general avoidance of assumption 
of responsibility, and largely indirect and allusive wording comes as little surprise, given 
the peculiar circumstances in which it took shape.
oN bAlANce
During the second half of the 17th century the prosecution of witches had ground to 
a halt, at least in most of western Europe. What is now the standard explanation of the 
end of the witch craze attributes it to “judicial skepticism”. According to Brian Levack, 
the author of the best general survey of the decline of the prosecution of witchcraft, the 
growth of the modern state brought important legal principles into being. These in-
cluded “formal restriction on the use of torture, the reversal of convictions upon appeal, 
and legislation that restricted the right of local courts to try witches under any circum-
stances”18. Taken together, these changes in attitude and behavior on the part of judicial 
and political elites can be seen as the immediate cause of the shift away from persecut-
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ing witches, especially in large numbers. In the meantime, other, deeper changes in the 
fields of culture, science, and religion contributed to bringing down the curtain on this 
collective tragedy19.
The best-known narrative that brings together these two broad dimensions of the tri-
umph of doubt in relation to witchcraft is Friedrich Spee’s Cautio Criminalis, originally 
published anonymously in 163120. Spee (1591-1635) was a German Jesuit with lengthy 
experience in both teaching moral theology and solving practical pastoral problems. It 
was in fact while serving as confessor to women condemned as witches that he became 
convinced of the non-existence of their crime. He wound up crediting witch persecu-
tion instead to a lethal combination of popular superstition and the manipulation of 
common emotions such as fear, hatred, and envy. Yet in his treatise he avoided any 
head-on challenge to the theory of witchcraft. Spee adopted instead the tactic of focus-
ing on procedural questions such as the validity of confessions extracted by torture or of 
the denunciations of others by persons who admitted to being practitioners of diabolic 
magic. Much of his credibility depended on his constantly referring – as did Salazar 
– to personal, eyewitness experience within a legal process that he relentlessly presented 
as vitiated by basic flaws regarding proofs of guilt. He framed his call for the reversal of 
the then-common view of witchcraft – that is, as an “exceptional crime” that required 
dispensing with traditional legal safeguards – within a rhetorical framework that em-
phasized simple arguments, appeals to reason and natural law, and humble recognition 
of the fallibility of human judgment. Read far beyond the central German territories 
whose deplorable recent history he evoked, Spee’s text neatly symbolizes the broader 
drift toward skepticism within the complex balance of beliefs about witches that had 
galvanized Europe’s spiritual horizons and judicial activity since the 15th century.
Developments within the Spanish Inquisition provide an earlier glimpse of the same 
experience of change. The 1614 text in this case is worlds apart from Spee’s quasi-auto-
biography. Rather, it reproduces the impersonal point of view typical of the directives 
of a highly bureaucratic institution. The very existence of these directives suggests how 
the case of the Navarre witches of 1609-1614 may be interpreted as a significant turn-
ing-point in the history of the prosecution of witchcraft. For while this was hardly the 
first time a tribunal had doubts about the reality of satanic witchcraft and whether it 
should properly charge individuals for this crime, it does seem to be the first time that 
an early modern legal system converted such doubts into official policy. The latter step 
involved an intriguing chain of paradoxes, beginning with the decision on the part of 
the maximum enforcers of the law not to enforce it. Rules requiring the identification 
and punishment of witches were circumvented long before they were repealed. In this 
respect they formed part of an expanding contradiction, one in which judges who did 
not believe in diverse aspects of the crime of witchcraft found one way or another not to 
prosecute it. Since the law itself was not touched, change was kept to a procedural level. 
This usually involved expanding possibilities for revoking local decisions, as well as urg-
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ing greater “diligence” – that is, close attention to procedure – at all levels of the judicial 
process21. Limiting discussion to matters of procedure and the quality of the evidence 
adduced meant, moreover, keeping it within the tribunal itself. Confining advice and 
debate to internal channels of communication effectively protected them from broader 
scrutiny. This policy without publicity, so to speak, united silence and equity to signify 
the triumph of both sorts of discretion alluded to at the beginning of this chapter.
That a situation that would eventually prevail throughout western Europe first emerged 
in Spain may not be all that surprising if one keeps in mind two factors. The first is the 
strength of a literally conservative theology and jurisprudence which in the end proved 
visibly reluctant to accept the intellectual innovation involved in identifying traditional 
magical practices – hitherto understood as popular “superstitions” and “deceits” – with 
the specific forms of demonic magic that were promulgated by, say, northern European 
treatises such as the Malleus maleficarum of 1486. The other is the Spanish Inquisition’s 
reputation as one of the most effectively centralized judicial systems in all of Europe, 
uniquely willing and able to place ever greater constraints on local judicial autonomy as 
an in-house means of correcting its own mistakes. A final paradox – and one of several 
which clearly work against the “Black Legend” that envelops this notorious institution 
– is that only a few years after the turn-around of 1614 the Inquisition actually began 
to initiate proceedings against persons local communities accused of being witches in 
order to protect them from other tribunals bent on murdering them.
Future studies will shed more light on the issues raised in this all too brief overview. In 
regard to Spain in particular, research pending includes closer study of the aftermath of 
the watershed trials of Navarre. Attention has been drawn to the all important Cata-
lan witch craze beginning in 1618. Witch policy elsewhere also needs to be examined. 
So does the question of the reception of and reaction to the instructions of 1614 on 
the part of local tribunals throughout the Spanish Monarchy, including the overseas 
empire. One of the more fruitful tasks will surely be to combine the two approaches 
presented separately above – cultural history on the one hand, and the history of law 
and politics on the other – in order to link the intellectual and legal crisis of credible 
witness and evidence with the question of the institutional response to failures of fo-
rensic judgment.
Part of this path has been cleared. Some time ago Barbara Shapiro’s overview of chang-
ing standards of evidence in 17th-century England brought the hitherto parallel histo-
ries of law and science to bear upon the question of witchcraft22. Since then much work 
in the history of science has focused on the rising status of a diffuse concept of witness 
in early modern experimental science, and some of it has looked to debates over witch-
craft as a fruitful terrain for reflection. It certainly is clear that numerous early modern 
natural philosophers showed strong interest in questions of witness, testimony, and evi-
dence. In the case of, say, Francis Bacon this meant bringing together his professional 
training in law with his deep involvement in issues of epistemology and the sources and 
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protocols of scientific knowledge23. A second line of approach has involved analysis of 
early modern legal decisions – jurisprudential, institutional, and otherwise – within 
different court systems. For example, several of the numerous studies of the Salem trials 
of 1692 – the single best-studied series of prosecutions in witch historiography – have 
focused on the crucial issue of the type of evidence admitted, along with certain of 
the other characteristics this trial shares with its equally idiosyncratic counterpart in 
Spain24. Finally, quite a few of the classic theological debates of this period could be 
profitably revisited with an eye for their relevance to the issues raised by the resolution 
of the Navarrese witch trials. The endless discussion of beliefs regarding miracles and 
confessions are two obvious candidates, and many others would lend themselves read-
ily to comparative and cross-denominational analysis25. When all is said and done, we 
would do well to take more careful heed of Marc Bloch’s prescient observation that 
it was no coincidence that the biblical scholar Richard Simon developed the science 
of scriptural exegesis while rescuing people from accusations of witchcraft26. The ram-
pant specialization that is one of the leading hallmarks of professional history today has 
separated spheres of inquiry that early modern thinkers regarded as invariably linked. 
Perhaps rethinking the end of witch persecution – quite literally a pan-European and 
interdisciplinary experience – could serve as a useful means of restoring some of the 
same spirit of historical breadth.
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source
Excerpts from the 1614 Instructions regarding the Present and Future Prosecution of 
Witches 
In 1614 the Supreme Council of the Spanish Inquisition sent the following letter to its offi-
cials in the tribunal of Navarre and elsewhere outlining the procedures to be followed in fu-
ture trials of witchcraft. The excerpts provided below focus closely on matters of procedure, 
and their aim is clear: to make the requirements for investigating and convicting witches 
stringent enough to make such trials virtually impossible. The reasons behind this change 
in policy – which actually confirmed the Spanish Inquisition’s longstanding tradition of 
avoiding harsh punishment of witches – are examined in the main body of this chapter.
Para... prevención en lo futuro y reparo en lo pasado y presente... se os envían los artículos y 
capítulos siguientes...
1. Que los inquisidores en las causas que de aquí adelante se ofrecieren de esta materia inqui-
eran y se informen si las muertes de criaturas y personas que las brujas confiesan haber muerto 
sucedieron en aquellos días o noches que ellas dicen, o si estaban enfermas antes, o si hubo algún 
accidente o causa para que muriesen natural o violentemente...
3. Item, que procuren saber si estas van realmente a sus prados y juntas a hacer los daños que 
dicen ellas, y quién les llama, y si alguno que no sea de ellos, las viese de noche o de día en sus 
juntas o haciendo algún maleficio.
7. Item, que los inquisidores adviertan a los predicadores por sí o por medio de los comisarios 
que den a entender que el perderse los panes y otros daños que vienen en los frutos, envía Dios 
por nuestros pecados, o por la disposición del tiempo, como acontece en otras muchas partes que 
no hay sospecha de brujas, y es grande inconveniente que tengan imaginación que estas cosas y 
otras enfermedades y sucesos que comúnmente suceden en aquella tierra los hagan solamente las 
brujas.
11. Item, que estén advertidos si algunas de las cosas que confesaren o testificaren de esta secta, 
se pueden comprobar con otras personas fuera de los cómplices...
18. Item, porque esta causa de brujería tiene dificultad y pueden ocurrir algunas dudas, es nec-
esario que las cosas de esta calidad, los inquisidores todos juntos, ordenen las diligencias que se 
hubieren de hacer y den sus pareceres cuando las hayan de remitir al Consejo...
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19. Item, que todas las testificaciones y probanzas, que de estas causas hubieren resultado, se 
suspendan para que, no habiendo novedad, no se pueda proceder contra ninguno por las testi-
ficaciones...
31. Item, por los inconvenientes que se han visto de las comunicaciones y conferencias, dividién-
dose en parcialidad de opiniones y haciendo diligencias particulares para verificar lo que cada 
uno sentía, se ponga silencio en estas conferencias, mandándolo así a los dichos comisarios y 
confesores...
... To avoid... confusion in the future, and to remedy past and present mistakes, we... are 
sending you the following articles and paragraphs.
1. Henceforth, when cases concerning this question arise, the inquisitors shall make inquir-
ies and find out whether the deaths of children and persons whom the witches confess to 
have killed, really took place on the days or nights they indicate; whether the persons in 
question were already sick or had suffered an accident, or whether there was some other 
reason for death to have come about through natural or violent causes...
3. Likewise,[the inquisitors] shall endeavor to learn whether these women really go to the 
meadows and gatherings to cause the crimes to which they later confess; who summons 
them; and if anyone who is not one of their number has seen them during the day or night 
at their gatherings or engaged in any evil art...
7. Likewise, the inquisitors themselves or through the commissioners, shall advise preachers 
to make it plain that the loss of harvests and other misfortunes which befall crops are sent 
by God on account of our sins and occur because of the weather, as happens in many other 
districts where there is no suspicion of witchcraft, and that it is most undesirable for people 
to imagine that these phenomena, together with other disasters and mishaps which com-
monly occur in these regions, are caused only by witches...
11. Likewise, [the inquisitors] are to observe in particular whether any detail can be proved 
through the testimony of other persons who are not themselves witches...
18. Likewise, because witchcraft is a difficult matter and can lead to confusion, it is neces-
sary that in questions of this nature all the inquisitors decide the sort of investigations to 
be carried out, and, all together, submit their votes when the case has to be sent on to the 
Council...
19. Likewise, all the testimonies and proofs resulting from these cases shall be suspended 
forthwith so that, in the absence of new evidence, no proceedings can be brought against 
anybody on the strength of the original testimonies...
31. Likewise, an absolute silence is to be imposed in view of the undesirable consequences 
of the public discussion of these matters which have divided people into factions and led to 
each man carrying out private investigations to confirm his own opinion. Let this be made 
very clear to the commissioners and the confessors...
Madrid, 29 August 1614
From: The Salazar Documents: Inquisitor Alonso de Salazar Frías and Others on the Basque 
Witch Persecution, ed. and trans. Gustav Henningsen, Leiden 2004, pp. 472-488.
